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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

BRYAN KEITH TAYLOR,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20030566-SC

INTRODUCTION
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse because the trial court
abused its discretion by summarily refusing to grant Taylor a continuance when the State
amended the information at the close of trial, and the trial court erred by commenting on
Mikayla's credibility in its consent jury instruction.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SUMMARILY REFUSING TO GRANT
TAYLOR A CONTINUANCE
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse because: (A) the trial

court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Taylor to seek a continuance, (B) the trial
court abused its discretion by summarily denying Taylor a continuance despite prejudice
to his case, and (C) the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial error.

A.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing to Allow Taylor to Seek a
Continuance.
In its response, the State argues Taylor waived his argument that the trial court

prejudiced his case by refusing to grant a continuance because, although he "generally
objected to an amendment," he "never suggested that []he needed a continuance to
prepare to meet the expanded time frame." Aple. Br. at 15. However, this Court should
reverse because Taylor did not waive his argument.
Defense counsel objected to amending the information because, "We weren't
given any notice prior to the direct examination and cross-examine [sic] of the witnesses
that there was going to be any change of date that might be relevant to the case." R.
209:189. Specifically:
To charge him with certain dates, to go through preliminary
hearing alleging certain dates, to allow us to focus on the
dates in question and prepare for trial based on those dates
and then not only the day of the trial but at the end of the trial
after all of the witnesses have been examined and crossexamined and excused to then say, Oh, now we want to say
it's a different date, I think is just unfair and in violation of
his due process.
R. 210:203. In other words, defense counsel objected because expanding the
information at the end of trial prejudiced Taylor so that a remedy was required. LcL The
State then clarified the "only" appropriate remedy was "a continuance." R. 210:203-04.
However, without allowing defense counsel to explain the need for a continuance,
the trial court summarily ruled it would not consider "continuing] the case at this point."

2

Id. at 204. Consequently, the trial court prevented Taylor from seeking a continuance,
thereby prejudicing his case by preventing him from properly preserving the amendment
issue for appeal and from creating a full record for appellate review. See State v. Wilson,
771 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding defendant waives f,his right to
complain on appeal" if he does not "request a continuance . . . to remedy the alleged
prejudice"); State v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985) (holding that on appeal
defendant must "show prejudicial error" in the record, and if the "record is silent," the
appellate court will "not presume either error or prejudice"); State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d
1208, 1215-16 (Utah 1987) (holding "the failure of a defendant to seek a continuance
negates any claim of surprise and amounts to a waiver of any claim of variance").
Besides, even though the trial court prevented Taylor from explaining the need for
a continuance, the continuance issue is preserved for appeal because the trial court
considered and ruled on the continuance issue. R. 210:203-04; see State v. Hoi gate,
2000 UT 74,][11,10 P.3d 346 (holding preservation rule exists because "the trial court
ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct
it," and "a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the
strategy of enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy
fails,. . . claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse" (quotations and citations
omitted) (alterations in original)); Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding issue preserved if "'"it is submitted to the trial court, and
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the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue"'" (citations omitted));
Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239,^26, 8 P.3d 281 (holding "party
must specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought 'to a "level of consciousness"'");
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting defendant's objection
timely because he "met the requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his
constitutional objection in the trial court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)),
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Summarily Denying Taylor a
Continuance to Consider the Amendment to the Information.
First, the State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion by summarily

denying Taylor a continuance because the "information need not even allege the time of
the offense, 'unless necessary to charge the offense.'" Aple. Br. at 18 (citing Utah R.
Crim. P. 4(b); State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1196 n. 4 (Utah 1984), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987)). However, regardless of whether
time is an element of the offense, a defendant has the fundamental right to "be apprised .
. . at the outset, by the indictment or information, with reasonable certainty of the exact
nature of the accusation against him." State v. Topham, 123 P. 888, 897 (Utah 1912).
Specifically, "due process requires that an accused by given sufficiently precise
notification of the date of the alleged crime that he can prepare his defense." M cNair v.
Havward, 666 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 1983). In fact, even where the alleged victim is a
child, the State must provide the defendant "the best information it has as to when the
4

alleged crime took place." Robbins. 709 P.2d at 773; State v. Wilcox. 808 P.2d 1028,
1033 (Utah 1991) (holding, even in cases where "young children are involved," the
defendant must be "fully apprised of the State's information regarding the time, place,
and date of the crimes").
Second, the State argues Taylor did not require a continuance to consider the
newly-alleged dates because his defense at trial was simply, "T didn't do it.'" Aple. Br. at
20 n. 3. However, it concedes that if Taylor's defense at trial was also, "T couldn't have
done it,'" meaning he had an alibi defense, then a continuance would have been
necessary to "prepare evidence that he also could not have committed the crime during
the new time frame." Aple. Br. at 20, 20 n. 3. Here, Taylor required a continuance
precisely because the amended information changed his defense from "I didn't do it" to
"I couldn't have done it" during the newly alleged dates. Aplt. Br. at 18. The time of the
alleged abuse was irrelevant under the original information because Taylor babysat
Mikay la during this time period. R. 209:121, 183. However, the time of the alleged
abuse became relevant under the amended information because Taylor did not babysit
Mikayla during most of the expanded time period. Id.; see Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1196,
1196 n. 4 (holding defendant not denied due process because more precise times were
not necessary since the defendants "did not at trial, nor do they now, raise any defense of
alibi" (emphasis added)). Had he been granted a continuance, Taylor would have
presented evidence to show he could not have committed the abuse before September or
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October because he was not babysitting Mikayla at that time.1 See Aplt. Br. at 18-19.
Specifically, Taylor would have elicited detailed testimony about his and Weales' work
schedules, the West Jordan babysitter's schedule, and the football season schedule.2 Id
Third, the State argues Taylor did not require a continuance because Mikayla's
preliminary hearing testimony put Taylor "on actual notice before trial that [Mikayla]
could not, with any certainty, place the abuse within the charged period." Aple. Br. at 17.
However, a defendant "'must be presumed ignorant of what is intended to be proved
against him except as he is informed by the information or indictment.'" Topham, 123 P.
at 891. This is especially true here, where the prosecution also heard Mikayla's
preliminary hearing testimony and did not move to amend the information based on this
testimony. Id. (holding "it is essential that the information or indictment, not the
evidence, apprise [the defendant] with reasonable certainty what is intended or expected
1

The State alleges that Taylor testified "he babysat Mikayla about 15 times during
the period he lived with her, beginning in about July or early August 2002." Aple. Br. at
9, 17. In reality, Taylor testified he started babysitting Mikayla "[t]owards the end of
summer," when Weales' "car broke down because she couldn't take Mikayla out to West
Jordan" anymore. R. 209:183. This statement was clarified by Weales' testimony that
Taylor did not start babysitting Mikayla until September or October 2002. Id. at 121.
The fact that testimony is unclear as to when Taylor started babysitting supports Taylor's
argument that a continuance was necessary to allow Taylor to defend himself against the
newly alleged dates. Aplt. Br. at 18-19.
2

The State suggests information about the televised football season would not
have assisted Taylor's defense because in "August 2002, at least 11 NFL preseason
games were televised, beginning on August 3 rd ." Aple. Br. at 18 n. 2 (citation omitted).
However, this information, had Taylor been granted a continuance to present it, would
have directly impeached Mikayla's testimony because Mikayla testified the abuse
occurred before her August 2 birthday. R. 209:82, 91-92.
6

to be proved, and what he is required to meet and defend"). Taylor did not enter trial
anticipating the information would be amended to correct a mistake. See, e.g. .State v.
Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding no prejudice where defendant
"knew the April 4 date on the information was incorrect"). Rather, Taylor prepared and
presented his defense believing he was charged with committing the alleged crimes
within a two-month time period, and, after resting, learned he was actually charged with
committing the alleged crimes within an eight-month time period. R. 138-39, 209-10.
C.

This Court Should Reverse Because the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion
Created Prejudicial Error.
First, the State argues Taylor's prejudice argument is "frivolous given [Taylor's]

own testimony that he began babysitting Mikayla as early as July." Aple. Br. at 21.
However, as stated above, Taylor did not testify he began babysitting Mikayla in July.
See supra note 1. Moreover, the lack of clarity in the trial testimony on this point
demonstrates precisely why a continuance was necessary. See kL
Second, the State argues Taylor's prejudice argument is "belied by the record"
because Mikayla's testimony about the time of the alleged abuse was "contradictory."
Aple. Br. at 21. However, although her testimony was largely contradictory, Mikayla
consistently testified at the preliminary hearing and trial that the alleged abuse occurred
before her August 2 birthday. R. 208:28-29; 209:82, 91-92. Had Taylor known about
the amended dates earlier, he would have presented evidence to show he could not have
abused Mikayla prior to September or October, thereby impeaching Mikayla's testimony
7

that the alleged abuse occurred before August 2. See supra I.B.; Aplt. Br. at 16-19.
Further, receiving a continuance would likely have changed the outcome of the trial
because Mikayla's testimony was the only direct evidence of guilt. See. Aplt. Br. at 20;
United States v. Revnoldo-Arango. 816 F.2d 683, 683 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(holding, to show abuse in denying continuance, defendant "must at least demonstrate
that he was prejudiced at trial by his inability to develop information which would have
enabled him to effectively impeach the credibility of the government's witness").
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED BY COMMENTING ON MIKAYLA'S CREDIBILITY IN ITS
CONSENT JURY INSTRUCTION'
This Court should reverse because: (A) Taylor properly preserved his objection to

the consent jury instruction, (B) the trial court erred by commenting on Mikayla's
credibility in its consent instruction, and (C) the trial court's error was prejudicial.
A.

Taylor Properly Preserved His Objection to the Consent Jury Instruction.
The State concedes that Taylor "timely objected to the second sentence" of the

consent jury instruction. Aple. Br. at 23. Regardless, the State argues Taylor did not
properly preserve the issue for appeal because he "never explained what the sentence
commented on or precisely how it would unfairly harm the defense," or claimed "the

3

The full jury instruction read, "A child under the age of fourteen cannot consent
to sexual activity. In other words, in this case you should not consider whether or not a
child willingly participated in sex acts, voiced any objection to such acts, or struggled in
anyway." R. 165. Taylor only objects to the second sentence. R. 210:196.
8

instruction would validate Mikayla's credibility or preclude the jury from properly
weighing her credibility." IdL However, Taylor properly preserved this issue for appeal.
The preservation requirement exists because "the trial court ought to be given an
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and "a defendant
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing]
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,. . . claiming] on
appeal that the Court should reverse." Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74 at ^}11 (quotations and
citations omitted) (alterations in original). Accordingly, an issue is properly preserved if
"'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the
issue."5" Hart, 945 P.2d at 129 (citations omitted); Holmstrom, 2000 UT App 239 at ^[26
(holding "party must specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought 'to a "level of
consciousness"'"); Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776 (noting defendant's objection timely
because he "met the requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his constitutional
objection in the trial court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)).
Here, the consent jury instruction issue is preserved because Taylor alerted the
trial court to its error rather than foregoing objecting with the strategy of saving the issue
for appeal, and the trial court fully considered Taylor's objection before overruling it. As
stated above, the State concedes that Taylor's objection was timely. Aple. Br. at 23.
Moreover, Taylor informed the trial court of his specific objection by explaining that he
had "no objection to quoting the statute and about consent or lack of consent and how
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that relates to a child," but "I think [the second sentence of the instruction] goes beyond
that and becomes a comment." R. 210:196. The trial court obviously understood
Taylor's objection because, although it asked the State to clarify its position, it did not
ask Taylor to clarify his objection. Id, at 198. The trial court then postponed ruling so it
could consider the objection and consult the applicable statute, and ultimately denied
Taylor's objection. Id at 202, 206-07.
B.

The Trial Court Erred By Commenting On Mikayla's Credibility In Its
Consent Instruction.
The State argues the trial court did not err by reading the second sentence of the

instruction because, when read as a whole, the jury instructions "made it clear that the
jury not only could, but should consider the reasonableness of the witnesses' testimony in
assessing credibility." Aple. Br. at 24-25 (citing State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 429
(Utah 1986)). However, even when read in conjunction with the other instructions, the
trial court's consent instruction was an erroneous comment on the evidence.
Jury Instruction No. 5 read:
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. There is no firm
rule the Court can give you for determining the truthfulness
and credibility of witnesses. Therefore, you should use your
own common sense, good judgment, and experience in life in
determining the believability of a witness and determining the
weight to be given any witness's testimony. You may
consider such things as the conduct and appearance of the
witness while testifying, the witness's apparent frankness or
lack of it; the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
testimony; opportunity to observe, ability to understand,
10

capacity to remember and any other common sense yardstick
you may wish to apply. You may also consider the witness's
motive for testifying, if any, and of course, the interest or lack
of interest the witness may have in the outcome of the case,
and the extent to which, if any, such interest may have
affected or colored his or her testimony.
R. 156. This instruction was a general statement of the jury's duties and was limited by
later instructions. IcL For example, regardless of its general freedom to decide
credibility, the jury was forbidden from deciding credibility by considering the "fact that
the defendant stands accused of a crime," considering "[w]hether offered evidence is
admissible," accepting an opinion simply because the testifying witness is an expert, or
considering the trial court's "comments or rulings."4 R. 158; 159; 168; 169.
Similarly, the consent instruction was read after Instruction No. 5 and served to
limit the factors the jury could consider in determining Mikayla's credibility. R. 165.
However, unlike the other limiting instructions, the consent instruction acted as an
improper comment on the evidence. See State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989)
(holding a trial "court may not comment on the evidence or upon the credibility of a
witness's testimony"). Although the first sentence of the consent instruction
appropriately forbad the jury from considering a child's consent to sexual activity when
determining guilt, the second sentence inappropriately forbad the jury from considering a

4

Taylor does not object to the inclusion of these instructions. Rather, these
instructions are presented as examples of instructions that, like the consent instruction,
limited the general guidelines of Instruction No. 5. See R. 150-74.
11

child's testimony concerning whether she consented, objected, or struggled when
determining her credibility. R. 165; see Aplt. Br. at 23-26; State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1,
432 P.2d 64, 72 n. 6 (Utah 1967) (holding juror permitted to Mscrutinize[] the witnesses,"
"note[] their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand," and place "his reliance on
those whom he believes to be telling the truth" (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)).
C.

The Trial Court's Error Was Prejudicial.
The State argues the trial court's instruction to the jury that it "should not consider

whether or not a child willingly participated in sex acts, voiced any objection to such
acts, or struggled in any way," was not prejudicial because Taylor "does not explain . . .
why it is unbelievable that a six-year-old child would be willing [to] accept 'a half a
dollar' to submit to the sexual desires of an adult." Aple. Br. at 26. Further, it asserts,
"there is certainly nothing inherently implausible in such an account." IcL However,
Taylor does not argue he was prejudiced because Mikayla's story was inherently
implausible. See Aplt. Br. at 26-28. Instead, he argues he was prejudiced because,
absent the trial court's erroneous consent instruction, there was a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable result. See id; Seel v. Van Per Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah
1998) ("In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained of must be
sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for
the defendant in its absence.").
At trial, Mikayla's testimony concerning consent was scant and, what detail she
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did provide, portrayed her as a willing participant in the sexual abuse.5 R. 209:72-103.
In a juror's "common sense" and life experience, such a sparse and dispassionate story of
acceptance may have connoted untruth.6 R. 156. Thus, had the jury been permitted to
consider this aspect of Mikayla's testimony when determining her credibility, there is a
reasonable likelihood it would have rejected her testimony as not credible. See Price v.
State. 347 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961) (holding comment on credibility
prejudicial because the witness was testifying "upon a material issue in the case").
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by
5

This argument does not imply Mikayla was a willing participant. Whether she
was a willing participant is irrelevant. See. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (2003); State v.
Martinez. 2002 UT 80,^13, 52 P.3d 1276 ("Unlawful sexual activity with a minor is a
strict liability crime."). Rather, it notes the reasonable likelihood that the jury would
have rejected Mikayla's testimony if permitted to consider all relevant credibility factors.
See State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58,^j67, 27 P.3d 1115 (holding jury permitted to draw
"reasonable inferences" in determining "credibility of witnesses").
6

In questioning its "propriety," the State misconstrues Taylor's argument. See
Aple. Br. at 26 n. 4. Mikayla, as an alleged victim, has the right to be treated with
respect and dignity. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-1 (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-4
(2003). However, this prosecution put Mikayla's credibility in question, and Taylor, as
the alleged perpetrator, had the right to demand Mikayla's credibility be subjected to
unhindered consideration of the jury before he is convicted based on her testimony. See
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah 1984) (holding, to determine credibility, jurors
may "consider all of the facts affirmatively shown, as well as any unexplained areas, and
draw whatever inferences may fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom in the light of
their own experience and judgment" (quotations and citation omitted)); S tate v. Mannion,
19 Utah 505, 57 P. 542, 544 (Utah 1899) (noting that in sexual abuse cases, "the
'accusation [i]s easy to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended,'"
especially where the evidence comes "from a child of six years, with no other witnesses
to the act").
13

summarily refusing to grant Taylor a continuance, and erred by commenting on the
evidence during its jury instructions.
SUBMITTED this ;?3 M day of April, 2004.

IXSTTSHS*!
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

14

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
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